Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

Fallout of Russia’s Wagner rebellion -by Brookings experts

| 0 Comentarios

Fighters of Wagner private mercenary group are seen atop of a tank while being deployed near the headquarters of the Southern Military District in the city of Rostov-on-Don, Russia, June 24, 2023. REUTERS/Stringer


The Economist


In early may Russia’s ambassador to Germany threw a party to honour Soviet victory in the second world war. Guests at the embassy, a Stalin-era colossus that occupies more German territory than the nearby parliament building, included a host of dignitaries. The last boss of communist East Germany, Egon Krenz, now 86, mingled under the chandeliers with Gerhard Schröder, chancellor of united Germany from 1998 to 2005 (and, more recently, a lobbyist for Russian energy firms). Tino Chrupalla, co-leader of Alternative for Germany (afd), a far-right party, sported a tie in the colours of the Russian Federation.

The event earned a bit of scorn in the German press, but little other notice. Seventeen months into Russia’s war on Ukraine public opinion here, as across Europe, overwhelmingly views Russia as an aggressor to be shunned, and Ukraine as a defender deserving help. Whatever their weight in the past, varied purveyors of Russian influence now stand diminished. Mr Schröder, for instance, chaired the board of the now-closed Nord Stream pipelines that addicted Germany to Russian gas. Last summer Russia shut the pipes, which mysterious saboteurs then blew up. The ex-chancellor has been bumped from clubs, disinvited from his Social Democratic Party’s functions (though he remains a party member), and stripped of government-provided office facilities. As for Mr Chrupalla, the afd leader’s cosiness with Russia did not just annoy German tabloids. Leaked messages revealed dismay among his own party’s MPs.

Yet even if Russia’s effort to project persuasive power across Europe has not quite succeeded, neither has it completely failed. A subculture of what Germans dismiss as Putinversteher—sympathisers who “understand” the Russian leader Vladimir Putin—thrives outside the mainstream. Throughout Europe their whispering forms a leitmotif in the rumble of complaint about seemingly unrelated troubles such as inflation, crumbling public services, overbearing regulations and fears of immigration. The grumblers have only just begun to challenge the scale of their governments’ generosity to Ukraine, which by February this year amounted to more than €60bn ($65bn) in economic and military aid from Brussels and the eu’s individual members (and €70bn if Britain is added, a sum roughly equal to America’s contribution). But if Ukraine’s fight goes on too long or goes wrong, there are plenty waiting in the wings to take up the blame game.

The spectrum of Europe’s Useful Idiots, a cold-war term for unwitting allies of communism, is wide. In politics, parties on both the far right and far left disagree on much; but over Ukraine these extremes have often converged in demanding an instant “peace” that would in effect reward Russian aggression with land. In media and academe, intellectuals still seem happy to ignore evidence of Russia’s imperial intent and its drift into criminality, and instead bemoan European entanglement in what they parse as a proxy war between America and Russia, or perhaps, speculating more grandly still, between America and China. And in the world of business, despite multiple rounds of Western sanctions, Russia still has plenty of “friends” too.

Mr Putin’s enablers include several European governments. Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary since 2010, has been the most obvious. The populist strongman has repeatedly criticised Western support for Ukraine and continued Hungary’s imports of Russian gas. His government also refuses to allow the transit of weapons given to Ukraine by Hungary’s fellow members of nato and the eu. Next-door Austria has, more quietly but equally profitably, largely sat out the struggle, too, citing its non-membership of nato and self-appointed role as a bridge between East and West, offering little aid to Ukraine even as its trade with Russia has surged.


La marcha a Moscú de Prigozhin (Letras Libres)

El intento de golpe de Estado del grupo de mercenarios Wagner fracasó, pero es probable que Rusia se enfrente a una lucha interna por el poder más pronto que tarde.


Washington Needs to Get Ready for Russian Chaos (F. Policy)

Is Revolt in Russia Good for America? (F Policy)

The Wagner mutiny has left Putin dangerously exposed (The Economist)

Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin’s tangled links to Vladimir Putin leave Kremlin in a bind ( in Berlin and  in Riga, F Times, July 7, 2023)

Russian insurrection: Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and the fallout ( in London and  and  in Riga, F Times, July 6, 2023)


Deja una respuesta

Campos requeridos marcados con *.

Este sitio usa Akismet para reducir el spam. Aprende cómo se procesan los datos de tus comentarios.