Classical interstate wars are quite a recent phenomenon in historical terms. Even accepting as states the old imperial actors, most violent confrontations in history until Napoleon mirrored irregular wars much more than conventional ones. No surprise, therefore, in Max Boot essay’s first point on «The Evolution of Irregular War», published in Foreign Affairs on Feb 5, 2013:
Pundits and the press too often treat terrorism and guerrilla tactics as something new, a departure from old-fashioned ways of war. But nothing could be further from the truth. Throughout most of our species’ long and bloody slog, warfare has primarily been carried out by bands of loosely organized, ill-disciplined, and lightly armed volunteers who disdained open battle in favor of stealthy raids and ambushes: the strategies of both tribal warriors and modern guerrillas and terrorists. In fact, conventional warfare is the relatively recent invention. It was first made possible after 10,000 BC by the development of agricultural societies, which produced enough surplus wealth and population to allow for the creation of specially designed fortifications and weapons (and the professionals to operate them).
The first genuine armies — commanded by a strict hierarchy, composed of trained soldiers, disciplined with threats of punishment — arose after 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia. But the process of state formation and, with it, army formation took considerably longer in most of the world. In some places, states emerged only in the past century, and their ability to carry out such basic functions as maintaining an army remains tenuous at best. Considering how long humans have been roaming the earth, the era of what we now think of as conventional conflict represents the mere blink of an eye.
Nonetheless, since at least the days of the Greeks and the Romans, observers have belittled irregular warfare. Western soldiers and scholars have tended to view it as unmanly, even barbaric. It’s not hard to see why: guerillas, in the words of the British historian John Keegan, are «cruel to the weak and cowardly in the face of the brave» — precisely the opposite of what professional soldiers are taught to be. Many scholars have even claimed that guerrilla raids are not true warfare.
This view comes to seem a bit ironic when one considers the fact that throughout history, irregular warfare has been consistently deadlier than its conventional cousin — not in total numbers killed, since tribal societies are tiny compared with urban civilizations, but in the percentage killed. The average tribal society loses 0.5 percent of its population in combat every year. In the United States, that would translate into 1.5 million deaths, or 500 September 11 attacks a year. Archaeological evidence confirms that such losses are not a modern anomaly…….
As reader Sean Ellison points out in his written answer to Boot’s essay, if each tribe was made up of only two people, and they fought to the death, then the number would be 100%. Or if each tribe was made up of two, and one died, 50%, and so on. It seems pretty obvious that battles fought among small groups would have a higher casualty rate than large battles/wars among large ones. Small samples amplify extreme results.
Sponsored by the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, discussed on April 22, 2013 his latest book Invisible Armies.
Relying on a diverse cast of unforgettable characters -not only Mao, Che, and Castro but also the legendary heartthrob Giuseppe Garibaldi, the eccentric Zionist, Orde Wingate, and the Quiet American, Edward Lansdale-, Boot did put up down many of the dogmas about unconventional warfare.
Invisible Armies: full video (1:17:39)
Teaching Module: Invisible Armies
February 2014
This module contains Teaching Notes by CFR Senior Fellow Max Boot with discussion questions, essay questions, activities, and additional materials for educators to supplement the use of Boot’s book Invisible Armies in the classroom. In this book, Boot offers a comprehensive history of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, and relates lessons of the past to current national security policy considerations.
Publication and Teaching Notes
Interactives