Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
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Conflict Barometer 2025 (Heidelberg)

The Conflict Barometer 2025 can be downloaded here.

With the 34th edition of the Conflict Barometer, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) continues its annual study on global conflict.

Since 1992, the Conflict Barometer has qualitatively and quantitatively recorded the dynamics of political conflicts, both violent and non-violent, worldwide. In accordance with the HIIK methodology, violent conflicts are classified according to their intensity into violent crises (intensity 3), limited wars (intensity 4), and wars (intensity 5). Non-violent conflicts are divided into disputes (intensity 1) and non-violent crises (intensity 2). The annual report is supplemented by conflict maps, graphics, and datasets as well as Spotlight texts that shed light on the wider context of current conflict dynamics.


The year 2025 was marked by a slight reduction of conflicts worldwide. However, the number of violent conflicts increased, just like the number of full and limited wars:

In 2025, the HIIK documented a total of 359 conflicts worldwide, an overall decrease of five conflicts. Of these, 221 were violent (62 percent) and 138 non-violent (38 percent). While 59 conflicts escalated and 45 de-escalated, 255 conflicts remained with the same intensity as in 2024. The HIIK opened six new conflicts in 2025 and four more retroactively.

Compared to the previous year, the number of wars rose from 27 to 28. Cambodia – Thailand (border), Pakistan (Islamist militant groups), South Sudan (opposition), and Iran – Israel conflicts escalated to full wars. Additionally, one war in Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria) erupted at the level of war as well. Five wars de-escalated, while 23 kept their intensity to 2024. The number of limited wars increased by two from 23 to 25 in 2025.

The number of non-violent conflicts decreased from 155 to 138. Two conflicts were settled by the conflict parties themselves: Türkiye (PKK, KCK); Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State). Six more closed due to inactivity.

As in previous years, the most common types of conflict were intrastate with 241, followed from afar by 60 interstate conflicts, then 41 substate, and finally, 17 transstate conflicts. While the number of inter- and intrastate conflicts remained constant, transstate conflicts increased by one and substate conflicts decreased by six. The most common of the ten methodically followed conflict items, material or immaterial goods which are sought by the direct conflict actors through conflict measures, were system/ideology (in 162 conflicts), resources (in 102 conflicts), and subnational predominance (in 88 conflicts), closely followed by national power (in 87 conflicts).

Once again, sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most wars. A total of 13 wars, two less than past year, were observed in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Twelve of these wars maintained their intensity from the previous year, while one conflict escalated to war. Three wars de-escalated to one limited war and two violent crises. A total of 86 conflicts were observed in sub-Saharan Africa, an decrease of two. 66 conflicts in the region were violent, three more compared to the previous year. Moreover, ten limited wars were observed in 2025, four less than in 2024.

In the West Asia, North Africa and Afghanistan region, the number of wars rose from five to six, compared to the previous year; the number of limited wars decreased by two with three observed. Three wars involved Israel, Hamas, Lebanon, and the State of Palestine. The other two wars were fought in Syria, one involving the new oppositional constellation and a new war in the Suwayda province of Syria. Furthermore, a twelve-day war between Iran and Israel increased the number of wars in the region. A total of 64 conflicts were observed in the region; 44 were violent. In total, conflicts decreased by two in the region.

In Asia and Oceania, the number of observed wars rose from five to seven compared to the previous year, five of which involved Myanmar, as in the past. Two wars escalated, one in Pakistan involving Islamist militant groups, and another around the Cambodian-Thai border; the number of limited wars decreased from five to three. Overall, the highest number of global conflicts of the year was observed in the region: 100, of which 55 were violent and 45 non-violent. This marked a decrease of two conflicts compared to the previous year.

In Europe, only one war, being the Russia-Ukraine war, and no limited wars were observed. In total, 47 conflicts were observed in the region, an increase of one. Out of them, twelve were violent, as in 2024.

In the Americas, while the only war in Haiti continued, the number of limited wars increased from three to five, involving Colombia, Mexico, and the United States in the Caribbean waters across Venezuela. Just as in 2024, a total of 62 conflicts were observed in the region, 44 of which were violent, nine more violent conflicts than in the previous year.

July 16, 2026
The HIIK Board

19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

NATO’s Logistics: Progress and Shortfalls (IISS)

A map of Europe showing the approximate routes of nine transport corridors on land and sea and highlighting several European countries bordering each other that have different rail-gauge breaks. For example, Poland uses a 1,435 millimetre standard gauge whereas Lithuania's is 1,520 millimetres.

European Transport Corridors and selected rail-gauge breaks   LINK TO ARTICLE

Key Takeaways

MILITARY MOBILITY: IMPROVED, BUT BOTTLENECKS REMAIN SEVERE
Customs delays, weak bridges, unsuitable roads, rail-gauge breaks and incomplete signalling systems continue to constrain movement, although EU and NATO initiatives such as ‘Military Schengen’, priority corridors and CEF-funded projects are useful steps. 
CRITICAL SUSTAINMENT GAPS PERSIST 
NATO lacks sufficient fuel distribution to the eastern flank, medical-evacuation capacity for high-intensity war, strategic and tactical lift, heavy-armour rail capacity and mobile bridging. 
GERMANY: THE DECISIVE HUB FOR REINFORCING THE EASTERN FLANK
Any Article 5 contingency would require large numbers of NATO troops, equipment and supplies to transit Germany. Berlin has begun planning seriously for this role, but rail, road, bridge and inland-waterway infrastructure still need major investment. 
NATO SUPPORT TO UKRAINE PROVES COMPETENCE, NOT SURVIVABILITY
Support to Ukraine has demonstrated that NATO can run sustained logistics into a live conflict zone at scale. But NATO operates in a permissive rear, free from interdiction, electronic warfare or strikes on its hubs, currently making this a test of institutional competence, not of whether that support can survive contact. 
EXERCISES SHOW NATO’S DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS
Recent exercises have shown that NATO can move and command large forces at scale, but have also exposed the vulnerability of concentrated forces and logistics nodes to sensors, UAVs and precision strikes. 
 

19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Jonathan Swan’s Dive into Trump’s Reality (The Weekly Show, Sep 10, 2026)

As Trump’s second administration pursues a radically different playbook from his first, Jon is joined by Jonathan Swan, New York Times reporter and co-author of the book «Regime Change.» Together, they discuss what’s changed between Trump’s first term and now, how to puncture the president’s reality distortion bubble, and the craft behind a great interview. Plus, Jon takes listeners’ questions about causing political diabetes and Trump’s 9/11 efforts.

 

18 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

The new German Problem: Germany and its place in Europe

International Affairs Cover Image for Volume 102, Issue 5

International Affairs

International Affairs, Volume 102, Issue 5, September 2026, Pages 1697–1720, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag061
Published: 09 September 2026

Abstract

For more than a century, the ‘German Problem’ has preoccupied observers of European politics. Traditionally understood as the challenge of managing a country deemed ‘too large for Europe, but too small for the world’, it centred on fears of overmighty German ambition and the destabilizing effects of Germany’s geopolitical weight. This article offers a historically grounded reassessment, arguing that since unification in 1990 the logic of the problem has inverted. Tracing continuities and transformations from the nineteenth century to the present, it shows that the contemporary dilemma no longer concerns the containment of excessive German power, but the mobilization of power insufficiently used.

The new German Problem arises from a persistent misalignment between three things: the expectations placed upon Germany, especially by its European partners; its considerable economic, political and latent military capabilities; and its domestic willingness to employ them. This misalignment has become acute since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and amid the retrenchment of American security guarantees under Trump, exposing how far German hesitation complicates efforts to strengthen European security and defence.

Drawing on a historical overview and an analysis of post-1990 foreign and security policy, from unification through the Zeitenwende to the Merz government, the article frames the new German Problem as a chronic tension between structural potential and the political will to exercise leadership. It closes by setting out four scenarios for how Germany might manage that tension, and what each would mean for…

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