Abstract
For more than a century, the ‘German Problem’ has preoccupied observers of European politics. Traditionally understood as the challenge of managing a country deemed ‘too large for Europe, but too small for the world’, it centred on fears of overmighty German ambition and the destabilizing effects of Germany’s geopolitical weight. This article offers a historically grounded reassessment, arguing that since unification in 1990 the logic of the problem has inverted. Tracing continuities and transformations from the nineteenth century to the present, it shows that the contemporary dilemma no longer concerns the containment of excessive German power, but the mobilization of power insufficiently used.
The new German Problem arises from a persistent misalignment between three things: the expectations placed upon Germany, especially by its European partners; its considerable economic, political and latent military capabilities; and its domestic willingness to employ them. This misalignment has become acute since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and amid the retrenchment of American security guarantees under Trump, exposing how far German hesitation complicates efforts to strengthen European security and defence.
Drawing on a historical overview and an analysis of post-1990 foreign and security policy, from unification through the Zeitenwende to the Merz government, the article frames the new German Problem as a chronic tension between structural potential and the political will to exercise leadership. It closes by setting out four scenarios for how Germany might manage that tension, and what each would mean for…
