Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

19 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
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Is Taiwan the next Ukraine? It’s more complicated (The Japan Times)

 

The Japan Times

BY GABRIEL DOMINGUEZ

 

When Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago this week, many lawmakers and experts in the U.S., Europe and Asia warned that the move could embolden China to carry out its long-standing threat to forcibly unify the mainland with self-ruled Taiwan.

The concern was that China and its increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would draw inspiration from Moscow’s aggression and invade Taiwan, further tilting the regional balance of power in its favor, particularly after the two sides had claimed to have a “no-limits” friendship.

The invasion prompted a number of political shifts unseen in years, as Japan — as well as a number of other countries — began bolstering their defenses and expanding security networks. Tokyo, for its part, adopted a mantra as the war broke out: “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.”

Indeed, the Ukraine conflict has served as a stark reminder that cross-border invasions are not a thing of the past and that deterrence may ultimately fail to prevent wars of aggression.

It’s unclear how China truly views the Ukraine conflict, offering up only opaque statements on the invasion. But if the Russian military’s struggles and its diplomatic and economic isolation are any indication, Beijing may think twice about the advisability of the military option with Taiwan.

At the same time, it’s worth noting that all analogies have their limits, and while there are parallels between Moscow’s war on Ukraine and Beijing’s approach to Taiwan, the scenarios and countries involved are also markedly different.

Many of the similarities revolve around Russia and China being authoritarian states that challenge the U.S.-led international order, with both targeting democracies that they claim are crucial parts of their territory.

…MORE

 

18 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
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Are U.S. Sanctions on Russia Working? (F Policy)

When Washington seeks to curtail Beijing’s ambitions or punish Moscow for its war in Ukraine, it often turns to a familiar tool: sanctions. In the last two years, the Biden administration has deployed unprecedented muscle in the form of sanctions as part of its foreign-policy arsenal.

The question is whether those sanctions work effectively. In which countries are they achieving their desired impact? Where are they less successful? And how does the use of sanctions impact U.S. power more broadly?

Join FP’s Ravi Agrawal in conversation with two experts: Agathe Demarais, the global forecasting director at the Economist Intelligence Unit and author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests, and Nicholas Mulder, an assistant professor of history at Cornell University and author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War. Together, they will explore how sanctions impact U.S. interests today and whether policymakers need to change course.

LINK to VIDEO

 

17 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
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Ukraine’s war, one year later (CSIS)

It has been one year since Russia invaded Ukraine. But numerous questions remain. Where is the war headed? What are the prospects for a political settlement? What are the major military lessons of the war? What are China and other countries in the Indo-Pacific learning from the war? And what are the policy implications for the United States and its Western allies?
Please join the CSIS International Security Program online on Friday, February 17th at 10:00 AM ET for a discussion on the state of the war, major lessons, and future trajectory.
Seth G. Jones, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at CSIS, will be joined by Eliot A. Cohen, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS; Emily Harding, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS; and the Honorable Michael Vickers, former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and CIA operations officer.
 
Related

Transatlantic Ties Transformed On Ukraine War Anniversary – OpEd (Eurasia Review)

How the War in Ukraine Ends (The New Yorker) v @LianaFix

1  año de guerra (Juan Luis Manfredi, El Independiente)

Ucrania, un año después (Gustavo Palomares, Huffington Post)

Investigating the war in Ukraine one year on (GIJN webinar)

Ukraine invasion reshaped global alliances, renewed fears (AP)

Putin’s Ukraine gamble seen as biggest threat to his rule (AP)

Biden in Poland for Ukraine war anniversary (FT)

There is no quick path to peace in Ukraine (Gideon Rachman, FT)

REFLECTIONS OF WAR A YEAR IN UKRAINE (AP)

Cómo la guerra ha cambiado el mundo (Andrés Ortega, Diario.es) 

One year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (John Mersheimer)

One year later (David Owen)

On Ukraine front, civilians cling on as troops repel Russia (AP)

Ukraine’s war in The Washington Post 

Ukraine’s war in The New York Times

Ukraine’s war in The Atlantic

Ukraine’s war in The Financial Times

Lessons from Ukraine (Brookings)

 

16 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Who blew up Nord Stream? (Ian Bremmer)

 

Dear Felipe,

Happy Wednesday from Dubai (well, it’s Thursday here), where I keynoted the World Government Summit earlier (right after Elon, of all people). I’m off to Germany in a few hours for one of my favorite events of the year, the Munich Security Conference. But enough about my whereabouts …

This week, I investigate the mystery of the Nord Stream explosions and answer your questions on the Munich Security Conference, the fate of Israeli democracy, and balloon-gate. Plus, your weekly rec from my dog Moose.

Let’s get to it.

– Ian

The controversial Nord Stream gas pipelines connecting Russia to Germany and Europe made headlines last September when several sections mysteriously exploded deep underwater, causing the surface of the Baltic Sea to bubble.

Multiple investigations determined the explosions were an act of sabotage, but they failed to identify a culprit. Most experts in the West pointed the finger at Russia, suspecting it was an attempt to worsen the winter prospects of an already energy-starved Europe to weaken its resolve to support Ukraine.

But I never fully bought into that theory.

Why would Russia blow up its own multi-billion-dollar infrastructure and destroy its biggest source of leverage over Germany, Europe, and the West? While the pipelines were already offline, the Russians were counting on the Europeans eventually getting weary of going without their cheap gas. The ability to turn the tap back on was Moscow’s best bet to undercut Western support for Ukraine.

Most importantly, it’s been nearly five months without a shred of evidence linking Russia to the sabotage. If there were anything at all that pointed to the Kremlin, US intelligence would have found it and we would already know about it. The fact that we don’t tells me the Russians probably didn’t do it.

Enter veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who last week published an explosive piece on his Substack blog alleging the United States blew up the pipeline in a joint covert operation with Norway behind Germany’s back and deliberately hidden from Congressional oversight.

The US and Norway categorically denied any involvement, calling Hersh’s article «utterly false» and «nonsense.» Still, the story was a propaganda gift to Vladimir Putin and his cronies, giving ammunition to US critics in Russia, China, and parts of the developing world.

If true, not only would it give Russia justification to escalate its asymmetric attacks against the West (which they were going to do regardless) — but also it would drive a wedge in the NATO coalition and have massive political (and even legal) ramifications for the Biden administration.

Does Hersh’s theory hold up?

The man is a journalistic legend, having earned a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the My Lai massacre and cover-up. But much of his work since then has been shoddy and — worst of all — rife with motivated reasoning. His (understandable) bias against the US intelligence community and national security establishment colored his widely discredited claims that the Osama bin Laden killing was a cover-up and that the Syrian government didn’t use chemical weapons.

The fact that this latest story aligns so neatly with Hersh’s ideological prism should invite skepticism. And indeed, a look under the hood of Hersh’s report reveals a whole lot of holes — and no smoking gun.

First, the explanation he lays out for hiding the operation from Congress isn’t internally consistent. Hersh initially claims the operation was devised without special operations personnel to avoid having to notify Congress. But any covert action pursued under Title 50 authority — the section of US code governing covert and direct action undertaken by the intelligence community — would have had to be briefed to Congress regardless of what assets were used.

Hersh then suggests that the operation was actually «downgraded» to avoid Congressional notification. But that’s not a thing: If it was a covert action, the government was legally required to notify Congress, end of story.

Second, Hersh’s interpretation of President Joe Biden’s and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s pre-invasion remarks as unambiguous threats of military sabotage is self-serving and disingenuous. If, as Hersh claims, the administration went through so much trouble to hide the operation from Congress, why would it foreshadow it publicly not once but twice?

The most logical reading is that they were instead referencing diplomatic engagements with Germany to halt pipeline operations, which were already underway.

Third, the publicly verifiable facts don’t align with Hersh’s timeline. He specifies that US Navy divers supported by a Norwegian Alta-class minesweeper planted the explosive charges during BALTOPS — the NATO military exercises conducted annually in the Baltic Sea — in June 2022. But publicly available data shows that none of Norway’s five Alta-class ships were in the region during that exercise.

Hersh further claims that a Norwegian P-8 Poseidon — a maritime control aircraft — dropped a sonar buoy on the day of the blast to trigger the explosives. But according to flight tracking, none of the five P-8s that Norway operates were in the area that day.

That neither of these assets shows up on tracking data is critical because Hersh’s core claim is that Norwegian assets were used precisely so these maneuvers wouldn’t need to be covert.

More broadly, the very contention that the US would sabotage infrastructure partially owned by a key ally (Germany) in concert with another shared ally (Norway) without alerting Berlin beggars belief given what we know about Washington’s strategic interests.

At the time, the Biden administration was pursuing closer ties with Germany on a range of issues, including tech regulation, China decoupling, and reversing the pullback in transatlantic cooperation initiated by the Trump administration. Blowing up Nord Stream would have jeopardized all those initiatives and invited Russian retaliation for a questionable benefit: definitively ending Germany’s already-dwindling dependence on Russia to strengthen NATO unity.

Targeting Germany in cahoots with Norway also would’ve risked fracturing the NATO coalition Biden had explicitly focused on bolstering from day one — a risky move for a generally risk-averse administration.

To be clear, none of this means the US didn’t do it. After all, Washington had been critical of these pipelines for years. And very few countries on Earth could pull off such a challenging operation, with the United States topping the list. Hersh could plausibly be wrong about the how while being right about the who, but his article doesn’t prove anything.

If not Russia or the US, then who?

Who else had the motive, the means, and the opportunity to pull off such a risky, complex, and fingerprint-free operation?

My money is on Ukraine. Ukrainians had the most to gain from blowing up this multi-billion dollar, Russian-owned cudgel. They were also the most risk-tolerant. Russia poses an existential threat to them, so they are willing to do almost anything to prevail. They knew they couldn’t win without a strong and united NATO behind them, and they knew the alliance would be vulnerable as long as Russia could leverage its gas against Germany.

Five months ago, I would’ve been skeptical that the Ukrainians had the technical and operational capabilities to do something like this. But I also didn’t think they’d be able to blow up the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea to Russia, itself quite a sophisticated operation. Nor did I imagine they could assassinate Darya Dugina just outside of Moscow. So it’s clear the Ukrainians are eminently willing and able to plan and execute high-risk reasonably complex operations.

Is it possible Ukraine had help from one or several NATO members? Poland, for instance, has been the most strident Russia hawk in the coalition, aware that it’s next on Putin’s wishlist should Ukraine fall. It’s not inconceivable that the highly competent Polish special forces could have pulled off such an attack. Of course, as far as means go, the Americans would have had the most operational capability to help Kyiv with this. That’s what made Hersh’s theory compelling at face value.

Absent any proof, though, it’s speculation all the way down. And make no mistake: There’s no proof of anything — not yet at least.

Beware of anyone who claims otherwise.

16 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Vigilancia con inteligencia artificial (RTVE)

 
 
RTVE@rtve
En Las Rozas (Madrid) vemos cómo funciona uno de los sistemas de videovigilancia con Inteligencia Artificial más avanzados de España: «El sistema nos permite buscar por apariencias» #10000díasObservados

El ser humano lleva miles de años diseñando dispositivos en los que descargar los trabajos más arduos. Pero en las últimas siete décadas, la inteligencia artificial (IA) ha permitido que esos dispositivos no solo se encarguen de tareas repetitivas, sino que sean capaces de imitar al cerebro humano para resolver problemas muy complejos. Permite explorar nuevos modos de transporte, herramientas de diagnóstico médico preciso o diseñar nuevos modos de relacionarnos en las redes. Pero la tecnología nos lleva a varios dilemas. ¿Qué impacto tendrá en el mundo laboral? ¿Cómo impedir posibles efectos nocivos? ¿Hasta dónde puede llegar el aprendizaje autónomo de las máquinas?

Todo comienza en una universidad de New Hampshire, en Estados Unidos. Un curso de verano del Dartmouth College reunió en 1956, en la localidad de Hanover, a un puñado de matemáticos interesados en diseñar máquinas capaces de simular algo parecido al razonamiento humano. Fue allí donde se bautizó la nueva rama como Inteligencia Artificial. Eran programas primitivos, pensados para resolver sencillos problemas de álgebra o jugadas de ajedrez.

El salto tardó en llegar, tras superar ciclos de esperanza y estancarse después durante años, hasta que en los 90 la tecnología adquiere un nuevo brío. La victoria de la máquina Deep Blue frente al campeón de ajedrez Garri Kaspárov tiene un gran impacto mundial. El siglo XXI trae computadoras más potentes y, en su segunda década, los sistemas de redes neuronales y el procesamiento de grandes cantidades de datos suponen una revolución.

Las máquinas pueden ya aprender por sí mismas. Registran información, elaboran patrones y buscan soluciones inmediatas y muy precisas cuando se les piden respuestas. Aprenden sin descanso, absorbiendo cada vez más materia prima para interpretar y contemplando más posibilidades a la hora de abordar un asunto.

Los pasos que llevan a la máquina a obtener una respuesta precisa no están del todo claros. El científico no conoce al cien por cien cómo se ha construido su razonamiento. Incluso en eso, el proceso artificial es muy similar al del cerebro humano y sus conexiones neuronales.