Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

3 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Imagen y realidad de España 2022 (Real Instituto Elcano)

 

Sistema de Indicadores de la Distancia entre Imagen y Realidad (SIDR). La Catedral de Santa María de Sevilla con la Giralda al atardecer

Resumen

El objetivo del SIDIR es comparar la realidad española con la evaluación que se hace de España por parte de la opinión pública internacional, en concreto por los ciudadanos de los países del antiguo G-8. Este ejercicio comenzó en 2014, cuando España sufría una crisis de prestigio internacional originada por su crisis económica, y se propuso identificar aquellos aspectos en los que la realidad española era claramente superior a su imagen en el exterior. La detección de esos elementos es de interés para todos los que, desde las instituciones públicas o desde ámbitos privados, empresariales o de la sociedad civil, actúan para mejorar la reputación y la imagen españolas. Continue leyendo →

3 febrero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

10 geopolitical developments to watch out for in 2023… (@d_jaishankar)

Imagen

1. It’ll be a bloody year in Ukraine. Russia’s massive mobilization and new tactics (see: Wagner in Soledar) along with Ukraine’s preparations and new armaments paint a grim picture. Question: will either Russia’s offensive or Ukraine’s preemption/counters prove decisive?

2. Global business reengages China. Some institutional investors may be more wary, but many are chomping at the bit to invest in China as it reopens from Covid Zero. Question: can national security and finance communities in the US and elsewhere reconcile? On whose terms? Continue leyendo →

31 enero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
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U.S. Deterrence in a More Multipolar Middle East (CSIS)

Center for Strategic and International Studies

It’s my pleasure to send you this brief of a tabletop exercise we ran last summer, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. With so much talk of the United States rebalancing away from the Middle East, we wondered how that context might affect a proliferation scenario in the Middle East.

As you can tell from the brief, the United States was in a less commanding position than might be ideal, but importantly, no other country filled any gap left by the United States. Russia and China actually sought to use the scenario to advance their interests vis-à-vis the United States. The exercise found that maintaining an open dialogue with Israel before, during, and after a proliferation scenario was of vital importance.

Please click here to download our brief. 

We remain grateful to the 14 experts who helped us conduct the exercise, as well as the 20 experts we interviewed around the world to help test propositions and deepen our understanding of our findings.

We have longer versions of this write-up that we’d be happy to share if you’re interested. Please let us know.

Sincerely,

Jon B. Alterman
Senior Vice President
Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy
Director, Middle East Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
1616 Rhode Island Ave, NW 
Washington, DC 20036
[email protected]

30 enero, 2023
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Subjective and Objective Measures of Democratic Backsliding

Andrew Little

University of California, Berkeley

Anne Meng

University of Virginia

Date Written: January 17, 2023

Abstract

Despite the general narrative that we are in a period of global democratic decline, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies to assess whether this is systematically true. Most existing studies of backsliding rely heavily, if not entirely, on subjective indicators which rely on expert coder judgement. We survey other more objective indicators of democracy (such as incumbent performance in elections), and find little evidence of global democratic decline over the last decade. To explain the discrepancy between trends in subjective and objective indicators, we develop formal models that consider the role of coder bias and leaders strategically using more subtle undemocratic action. The simplest explanation is that recent declines in average democracy scores are driven by changes in coder bias. While we cannot rule out the possibility that the world is experiencing major democratic backsliding almost exclusively in ways which require subjective judgement to detect, this claim not justified by existing evidence.

Little, Andrew and Meng, Anne, Subjective and Objective Measurement of Democratic Backsliding (January 17, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4327307

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LINK

Opinion

 What if the crisis of democracy is (mostly) in our heads?

 
The Washington Post (Jan 30, 2023) at 8:30 h
 
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, advanced as the Cold War came to a close, is a pundit’s favorite punching bag. The sense of democratic optimism, security and confidence that defined the 1990s has clearly diminished. In the past decade, Western global influence declined; great-power competition surged; societies polarized and populist leaders rose.

But Fukuyama’s basic interpretation of the Soviet Union’s collapse — that it left liberal democracy as the “final form of human government” with widespread appeal and prestige — has proven surprisingly resilient. A new research paper challenges the avalanche of popular and academic commentary declaring that, especially since 2016, the world has faced a systemic crisis of democracy.

In “Subjective and Objective Measures of Democratic Backsliding,” the political scientists Andrew Little of the University of California at Berkeley and Anne Meng of the University of Virginia find that the post-Cold War expansion of democracy in nations around the world has, on average, held. “Recent studies that find evidence of global backsliding,” they observe, “rely heavily if not entirely on subjective indicators” — such as asking experts to rate, based on their own judgment, the extent to which an election was “free and fair.”

Little and Meng instead measure democracy based on quantifiable factors less susceptible to individual bias. They find, for example, no overall decline in electoral competition. Across the world, “The rate of leader and ruling party turnover has remained fairly constant since the late 1990s,” the paper says. “If anything, the vote shares of incumbent leaders in executive elections and incumbent parties in legislatures have decreased in recent years.”

They also measured the prevalence of constraints on national leaders, such as term limits. From 2000 to 2018, according to the paper, 60 leaders sought to evade term limits, and 34 succeeded, but the rate was “fairly constant” over time. In an attempt to objectively measure press freedom, the authors analyze data from the Committee to Protect Journalists. It’s a mixed picture: Murders of journalists have been declining since 2008, but the number of journalists imprisoned has been rising since 2000.

The authors created their own democracy index reaching back to 1980, relying on hard inputs such as the share of a population eligible to vote, rather than subjective interpretation by experts. “The index in 2020 is nearly as high as it has ever been,” they conclude.

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