Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

21 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

NAZA – a new film directed by Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor, produced by the Guardian

Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor look off camera.

Photo Illustration by The New York Times

Opinion

Michelle Goldberg

Israel is treating the new documentary “NAZA,” by the Israeli filmmakers Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor, less like bad publicity than a national security crisis.

Eyal Zamir, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, pledged to use “every tool at our disposal” against the documentary, which features anonymous interviews with 24 intelligence officers and soldiers, most involved in remote strikes in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for legislation that would let the state strip Abraham and Szor of their citizenship. Israel’s culture minister has asked the Interior Ministry to investigate them for treason. Activists and staff members from the far-right party of Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir protested outside Szor’s parents’ house, where a speaker called for Abraham and Szor to be executed and their families’ homes demolished, as often happens to the homes of Palestinians.

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When NAZA premiered at Venice earlier this month, it sent shockwaves across the globe. Composed of interviews with 24 anonymous Israeli intelligence officers and soldiers, NAZA is a haunting exposé of the tools that the Israeli military uses to carry out the remote killing of Palestinians in Gaza – including AI, mass surveillance, and devastating airstrikes that kill civilians and raze homes.

RELATED

NAZA: Netanyahu orders identification and prosecution of film’s interviewees (Guardian)

Israel promotes film that mimics NAZA documentary (Guardian)

NAZA review – Israeli intelligence officers cast chilling light on civilian deaths

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To watch more Guardian Documentaries, visit theguardian.com/documentaries

Bing Vídeos 

No Other Land – Official UK Trailer  @YouTube

NAZA EN LA VANGUARDIA

“NETANYAHU RATTLED?” Venice-Winning “NAZA” Documentary Sparks Fury Over Gaza Civilian Death Claims

Elena Kostyuchenko@mirrorsbreath (
Acabo de ver NAZA en el Festival de Cine de Nueva York. Delante del cine había diez policías, en la entrada revisaron las bolsas. Esperaban protestas, pero no hubo protestas: solo un coche que daba vueltas por la manzana con un adhesivo en la puerta que decía NO COMPROBADO.
 
Antes de la proyección, varias personas hablaron brevemente; una de ellas fue Harry Davies, periodista del departamento de investigaciones de *the Guardian*, con cuya colaboración se hizo la película. Harry recordó que el periodismo de investigación se basa en información de fuentes, y que el anonimato de las fuentes es una institución importante. También dijo que el departamento de investigaciones de *the Guardian*, él y sus colegas específicamente, verificaron todas las afirmaciones hechas por los protagonistas: y se confirmaron.
 
Mucho de lo que se cuenta en la película ya se había publicado antes en el medio israelí-palestino +972 (conozco personalmente a sus periodistas). La película en sí es el resultado de tres años de trabajo de un equipo. Ahora sobre la película. No puedo decir si es genial o no genial: es abrumadora. La gente habla de su trabajo, a su alrededor sucede Tel Aviv, vemos personas en las ventanas y pensamos en otras personas en otras ventanas a 60 kilómetros a lo largo de la costa. No es sobre «un mal incidente en la guerra alguna vez», es sobre un sistema bien afinado de asesinatos.
 
Lo que muchos críticos han pasado por alto: el uso de IA que selecciona personas como objetivos para matar. Según estimaciones internas, la efectividad actual es de aproximadamente el 85 %: es decir, al menos el 15 % de los objetivos no tenían ninguna relación con Hamás. Sin embargo, objetivo no equivale a víctima. De ahí el propio término NAZA: daños colaterales. Los oficiales cuentan que el umbral de duda es de 20 NAZA. Matar a 20 personas por un presunto militante puede ser problemático; hasta 20 está completamente bien. Pero también mencionaron 500 NAZA aprobados, y 200 NAZA. ¿Por qué esas cifras? A los presuntos o reales miembros de Hamás los matan de noche, en sus casas: junto con todos los que estén cerca.
 
Se puede estimar con bastante precisión el número de víctimas potenciales: gracias al sistema global de vigilancia y control. Se puede hackear un teléfono y usarlo como micrófono. ¿Oyes el llanto de un bebé de fondo? El bebé cuenta como un solo NAZA. Hay mucho más sobre eso ahí. A los servicios secretos israelíes no les será fácil identificar a los que hablan: no hay caras, a veces ni siquiera se distinguen las cabezas, las voces están alteradas, la caligrafía está borrosa.
 
Muchos de los que hablan dibujan y firman en un papel lo que vieron en la pantalla. Muchos de ellos combaten a distancia. Uno de los que habla estuvo en el corazón de Gaza: quemando casas. No hubo ovaciones, nadie aplaudió en absoluto. Los créditos fueron recibidos en un silencio profundo. Se oía que algunos lloraban; el vecino a mi izquierda rezaba «Oh Jesús, Jesús». Qué más me pareció importante. Qué tan menos la guerra se libra a ciegas. Qué tan así cada elección, cada paso en esta guerra —y en todas las guerras modernas— se evalúa y documenta: y aun así la gente sigue tomando esas elecciones.
 
Algunos describen su rol como técnico, otros hablan del prestigio de la inteligencia, de la misión, de la punta de lanza dirigida al enemigo; una persona habla de *fun*. Casi nadie, según sus palabras, siente odio. El odio no es necesario para matar, la ignorancia tampoco. ¿Recuerdan la parábola del humo constante de la crematorio y «mirábamos hacia otro lado»? Ya no se puede decir eso. Muy pronto la película estará disponible en el sitio web de *the Guardian*. La recomiendo muchísimo a todo el mundo. No se apresuren a opinar ahora: podrían sentirse idiotas solo un par de semanas después; esperen, vean y hablemos.

19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

RUSSIE: Paysage médiatique

Imagen

RSF@RSF_inter
Deux ans après la mort en détention en #Russie de la journaliste ukrainienne Victoria Roshchyna, après plus d’un an de captivité et de torture, RSF lui rend hommage. Moscou doit répondre de ce qui lui est arrivé. rsf.org/fr/vika-ne-se-
 
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19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

Conflict Barometer 2025 (Heidelberg)

The Conflict Barometer 2025 can be downloaded here.

With the 34th edition of the Conflict Barometer, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) continues its annual study on global conflict.

Since 1992, the Conflict Barometer has qualitatively and quantitatively recorded the dynamics of political conflicts, both violent and non-violent, worldwide. In accordance with the HIIK methodology, violent conflicts are classified according to their intensity into violent crises (intensity 3), limited wars (intensity 4), and wars (intensity 5). Non-violent conflicts are divided into disputes (intensity 1) and non-violent crises (intensity 2). The annual report is supplemented by conflict maps, graphics, and datasets as well as Spotlight texts that shed light on the wider context of current conflict dynamics.


The year 2025 was marked by a slight reduction of conflicts worldwide. However, the number of violent conflicts increased, just like the number of full and limited wars:

In 2025, the HIIK documented a total of 359 conflicts worldwide, an overall decrease of five conflicts. Of these, 221 were violent (62 percent) and 138 non-violent (38 percent). While 59 conflicts escalated and 45 de-escalated, 255 conflicts remained with the same intensity as in 2024. The HIIK opened six new conflicts in 2025 and four more retroactively.

Compared to the previous year, the number of wars rose from 27 to 28. Cambodia – Thailand (border), Pakistan (Islamist militant groups), South Sudan (opposition), and Iran – Israel conflicts escalated to full wars. Additionally, one war in Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria) erupted at the level of war as well. Five wars de-escalated, while 23 kept their intensity to 2024. The number of limited wars increased by two from 23 to 25 in 2025.

The number of non-violent conflicts decreased from 155 to 138. Two conflicts were settled by the conflict parties themselves: Türkiye (PKK, KCK); Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State). Six more closed due to inactivity.

As in previous years, the most common types of conflict were intrastate with 241, followed from afar by 60 interstate conflicts, then 41 substate, and finally, 17 transstate conflicts. While the number of inter- and intrastate conflicts remained constant, transstate conflicts increased by one and substate conflicts decreased by six. The most common of the ten methodically followed conflict items, material or immaterial goods which are sought by the direct conflict actors through conflict measures, were system/ideology (in 162 conflicts), resources (in 102 conflicts), and subnational predominance (in 88 conflicts), closely followed by national power (in 87 conflicts).

Once again, sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most wars. A total of 13 wars, two less than past year, were observed in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Twelve of these wars maintained their intensity from the previous year, while one conflict escalated to war. Three wars de-escalated to one limited war and two violent crises. A total of 86 conflicts were observed in sub-Saharan Africa, an decrease of two. 66 conflicts in the region were violent, three more compared to the previous year. Moreover, ten limited wars were observed in 2025, four less than in 2024.

In the West Asia, North Africa and Afghanistan region, the number of wars rose from five to six, compared to the previous year; the number of limited wars decreased by two with three observed. Three wars involved Israel, Hamas, Lebanon, and the State of Palestine. The other two wars were fought in Syria, one involving the new oppositional constellation and a new war in the Suwayda province of Syria. Furthermore, a twelve-day war between Iran and Israel increased the number of wars in the region. A total of 64 conflicts were observed in the region; 44 were violent. In total, conflicts decreased by two in the region.

In Asia and Oceania, the number of observed wars rose from five to seven compared to the previous year, five of which involved Myanmar, as in the past. Two wars escalated, one in Pakistan involving Islamist militant groups, and another around the Cambodian-Thai border; the number of limited wars decreased from five to three. Overall, the highest number of global conflicts of the year was observed in the region: 100, of which 55 were violent and 45 non-violent. This marked a decrease of two conflicts compared to the previous year.

In Europe, only one war, being the Russia-Ukraine war, and no limited wars were observed. In total, 47 conflicts were observed in the region, an increase of one. Out of them, twelve were violent, as in 2024.

In the Americas, while the only war in Haiti continued, the number of limited wars increased from three to five, involving Colombia, Mexico, and the United States in the Caribbean waters across Venezuela. Just as in 2024, a total of 62 conflicts were observed in the region, 44 of which were violent, nine more violent conflicts than in the previous year.

July 16, 2026
The HIIK Board

19 septiembre, 2026
por Felipe Sahagún
Sin comentarios

NATO’s Logistics: Progress and Shortfalls (IISS)

A map of Europe showing the approximate routes of nine transport corridors on land and sea and highlighting several European countries bordering each other that have different rail-gauge breaks. For example, Poland uses a 1,435 millimetre standard gauge whereas Lithuania's is 1,520 millimetres.

European Transport Corridors and selected rail-gauge breaks   LINK TO ARTICLE

Key Takeaways

MILITARY MOBILITY: IMPROVED, BUT BOTTLENECKS REMAIN SEVERE
Customs delays, weak bridges, unsuitable roads, rail-gauge breaks and incomplete signalling systems continue to constrain movement, although EU and NATO initiatives such as ‘Military Schengen’, priority corridors and CEF-funded projects are useful steps. 
CRITICAL SUSTAINMENT GAPS PERSIST 
NATO lacks sufficient fuel distribution to the eastern flank, medical-evacuation capacity for high-intensity war, strategic and tactical lift, heavy-armour rail capacity and mobile bridging. 
GERMANY: THE DECISIVE HUB FOR REINFORCING THE EASTERN FLANK
Any Article 5 contingency would require large numbers of NATO troops, equipment and supplies to transit Germany. Berlin has begun planning seriously for this role, but rail, road, bridge and inland-waterway infrastructure still need major investment. 
NATO SUPPORT TO UKRAINE PROVES COMPETENCE, NOT SURVIVABILITY
Support to Ukraine has demonstrated that NATO can run sustained logistics into a live conflict zone at scale. But NATO operates in a permissive rear, free from interdiction, electronic warfare or strikes on its hubs, currently making this a test of institutional competence, not of whether that support can survive contact. 
EXERCISES SHOW NATO’S DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS
Recent exercises have shown that NATO can move and command large forces at scale, but have also exposed the vulnerability of concentrated forces and logistics nodes to sensors, UAVs and precision strikes.