Relaciones Internacionales – Comunicación Internacional

25 mayo, 2015
por Felipe Sahagún
0 Comentarios

John Nash y la teoría de los juegos

Muere John Nash, el matemático de la “mente brillante”

24 mayo, 2015
por Felipe Sahagún
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La España que vota en 2015

Guía para saber quién gana y quién pierde este 24-M

24/05/2015 a las 00:01    

  • Más de 35 millones de votantes deciden el poder en 13 comunidades y 8.122 ayuntamientos
  • Lo que ocurra en Madrid, Barcelona y Valencia, la intensidad del castigo al PP, la recuperación o no del PSOE y la fuerza con que irrumpen Podemos y C’s marcarán la lectura del resultado

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Como si votáramos por vez primera

El futuro que espera a la democracia con el nuevo sistema de partidos que emerja hoy de las urnas no está escrito, como nada en la vida: eso es lo que rodea a estas elecciones de cierto aura inaugural

34.634.572 electores son españoles residentes en España, 6.649 viven en el extranjero y 463.765 son …
Son diez los escenarios clave en los que se dirimirán el éxito y el fracaso electoral
¿Qué se vota? ¿Quién puede votar? ¿Se puede votar solo en las municipales o solo en las autonómicas? Guía …
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.@PPopular, @PSOE, @ahorapodemos y @CiudadanosCs: sus programas, a análisis http://mun.do/1EqQ4jw 

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¿Recordáis los últimos resultados electorales y lo que vaticina el CIS? Aquí os lo recordamos http://mun.do/1drhMHI 

23 mayo, 2015
por Felipe Sahagún
0 Comentarios

La ONU cumple 70 años

Unas Naciones Unidas fuertes. Un mundo mejor

El 70 aniversario de las Naciones Unidas es una oportunidad para reflexionar sobre la historia de las Naciones Unidas y hacer un balance de sus logros más perdurables. También es una ocasión única para destacar las áreas que requieren un mayor esfuerzo por parte de la Organización, así como de la comunidad internacional en su conjunto, para dar una respuesta a los retos actuales y futuros de los tres pilares de su labor: la paz y la seguridad, el desarrollo y los derechos humanos. Más información

La Carta

La Carta de las Naciones Unidas es el tratado que permitió fundar la Organización. Vea cómo se elaboró este documento histórico.

#onu70años

Cronología: 70 años, ocho Secretarios Generales

Grabaciones históricas de nuestra radio

Galería de fotos ONU70

23 mayo, 2015
por Felipe Sahagún
0 Comentarios

Hersh and the Bin Laden story

The Killing of Osama bin Laden
Seymour M. Hersh
Vol. 37 No. 10 · 21 May 2015
pages 3-12 (10356 words)

It’s been four years since a group of US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in a night raid on a high-walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The killing was the high point of Obama’s first term, and a major factor in his re-election. The White House still maintains that the mission was an all-American affair, and that the senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were not told of the raid in advance. This is false, as are many other elements of the Obama administration’s account. The White House’s story might have been written by Lewis Carroll: would bin Laden, target of a massive international manhunt, really decide that a resort town forty miles from Islamabad would be the safest place to live and command al-Qaida’s operations? He was hiding in the open. So America said.

The most blatant lie was that Pakistan’s two most senior military leaders – General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the army staff, and General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, director general of the ISI – were never informed of the US mission. This remains the White House position despite an array of reports that have raised questions, including one by Carlotta Gall in the New York Times Magazine of 19 March 2014. Gall, who spent 12 years as the Times correspondent in Afghanistan, wrote that she’d been told by a ‘Pakistani official’ that Pasha had known before the raid that bin Laden was in Abbottabad. The story was denied by US and Pakistani officials, and went no further. In his book Pakistan: Before and after Osama (2012), Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, a think tank in Islamabad, wrote that he’d spoken to four undercover intelligence officers who – reflecting a widely held local view – asserted that the Pakistani military must have had knowledge of the operation. The issue was raised again in February, when a retired general, Asad Durrani, who was head of the ISI in the early 1990s, told an al-Jazeera interviewer that it was ‘quite possible’ that the senior officers of the ISI did not know where bin Laden had been hiding, ‘but it was more probable that they did [know]. And the idea was that, at the right time, his location would be revealed. And the right time would have been when you can get the necessary quid pro quo – if you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.’

This spring I contacted Durrani and told him in detail what I had learned about the bin Laden assault from American sources: that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Kayani and Pasha knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters delivering the Seals to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of the administration’s account were false.

‘When your version comes out – if you do it – people in Pakistan will be tremendously grateful,’ Durrani told me. ‘For a long time people have stopped trusting what comes out about bin Laden from the official mouths. There will be some negative political comment and some anger, but people like to be told the truth, and what you’ve told me is essentially what I have heard from former colleagues who have been on a fact-finding mission since this episode.’ As a former ISI head, he said, he had been told shortly after the raid by ‘people in the “strategic community” who would know’ that there had been an informant who had alerted the US to bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, and that after his killing the US’s betrayed promises left Kayani and Pasha exposed.

The major US source for the account that follows is a retired senior intelligence official who was knowledgeable about the initial intelligence about bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. He also was privy to many aspects of the Seals’ training for the raid, and to the various after-action reports. Two other US sources, who had access to corroborating information, have been longtime consultants to the Special Operations Command. I also received information from inside Pakistan about widespread dismay among the senior ISI and military leadership – echoed later by Durrani – over Obama’s decision to go public immediately with news of bin Laden’s death. The White House did not respond to requests for comment.

It began with a walk-in. In August 2010 a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer approached Jonathan Bank, then the CIA’s station chief at the US embassy in Islamabad. He offered to tell the CIA where to find bin Laden in return for the reward that Washington had offered in 2001. Walk-ins are assumed by the CIA to be unreliable, and the response from the agency’s headquarters was to fly in a polygraph team. The walk-in passed the test. ‘So now we’ve got a lead on bin Laden living in a compound in Abbottabad, but how do we really know who it is?’ was the CIA’s worry at the time, the retired senior US intelligence official told me.

The US initially kept what it knew from the Pakistanis. ‘The fear was that if the existence of the source was made known, the Pakistanis themselves would move bin Laden to another location. So only a very small number of people were read into the source and his story,’ the retired official said. ‘The CIA’s first goal was to check out the quality of the informant’s information.’ The compound was put under satellite surveillance. The CIA rented a house in Abbottabad to use as a forward observation base and staffed it with Pakistani employees and foreign nationals. Later on, the base would serve as a contact point with the ISI; it attracted little attention because Abbottabad is a holiday spot full of houses rented on short leases. A psychological profile of the informant was prepared. (The informant and his family were smuggled out of Pakistan and relocated in the Washington area. He is now a consultant for the CIA.)

In October, Obama was briefed on the intelligence. His response was cautious, the retired official said. ‘It just made no sense that bin Laden was living in Abbottabad. It was just too crazy. The president’s position was emphatic: “Don’t talk to me about this any more unless you have proof that it really is bin Laden.”’ The immediate goal of the CIA leadership and the Joint Special Operations Command was to get Obama’s support. They believed they would get this if they got DNA evidence, and if they could assure him that a night assault of the compound would carry no risk. The only way to accomplish both things, the retired official said, ‘was to get the Pakistanis on board’.

During the late autumn of 2010, the US continued to keep quiet about the walk-in, and Kayani and Pasha continued to insist to their American counterparts that they had no information about bin Laden’s whereabouts. ‘The next step was to figure out how to ease Kayani and Pasha into it – to tell them that we’ve got intelligence showing that there is a high-value target in the compound, and to ask them what they know about the target,’ the retired official said. ‘The compound was not an armed enclave – no machine guns around, because it was under ISI control.’ The walk-in had told the US that bin Laden had lived undetected from 2001 to 2006 with some of his wives and children in the Hindu Kush mountains, and that ‘the ISI got to him by paying some of the local tribal people to betray him.’ (Reports after the raid placed him elsewhere in Pakistan during this period.) Bank was also told by the walk-in that bin Laden was very ill, and that early on in his confinement at Abbottabad, the ISI had ordered Amir Aziz, a doctor and a major in the Pakistani army, to move nearby to provide treatment. ‘The truth is that bin Laden was an invalid, but we cannot say that,’ the retired official said. ‘“You mean you guys shot a cripple? Who was about to grab his AK-47?”’

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Related

The media’s reaction to Seymour Hersh’s bin Laden scoop has been disgraceful  -CJR. By Trevor Timm (Friday, May 15, 2015)